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The Right to Shout Fire in a Crowded 
Theatre: Hateful Speech and the First 
Amendment 
Ronald D. Rotunda* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dictum that the First Amendment 
“would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre,”1 
summarizes free speech law for many people. They think it allows 
Congress to make some laws restricting, if the laws are necessary, 
even though the First Amendment says, “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging freedom of speech or of the press.”2 Plug “falsely 
shouting fire in a crowded theater” into Google and you will find 
over 3.3 million results.3 Remove the adjective, “crowded” (Justice 
Holmes did not use it), and the references climb to about 9 million.4 
Limit the phrase to case citations in Westlaw, and you find over 200 
cases and another 200 court documents. These references are often 
approving if not fawning. 
Yet, if we look closely at what the law as it is now—rather than 
as Justice Holmes imagined it, or as Justice Holmes thought it 
should be—we will see that Justice Holmes was wrong. It would be 
a very rare circumstance that the government could constitutionally 
prohibit one from shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre.  
The United States Supreme Court has travelled on a long 
and twisting path to reach that destination. We owe our thanks 
 
 * Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman 
University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. This Article is being published as part of Chapman Law 
Review symposium honoring the life and work of Professor Ronald Rotunda (1945-2018). 
 1 The full quotation is: 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man 
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.  
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (internal citations omitted). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).  
 3 Note, the number of results is as of April 10, 2019. 
 4 Note, the number of results is as of April 10, 2019. 
Do Not Delete 5/29/2019 2:36 PM 
320 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
to the Greek philosophers and playwrights who first blazed that 
trail, nearly two and one-half millennia ago. 
As discussed below, the Supreme Court now protects hateful 
speech, such as a burning cross.5 It protects threats against the 
life of the President, except for the narrow category of “true 
‘threat[s].’”6 In general, speech alone (in contrast to speech plus 
an action or an activity) is protected,7 which is why there is a 
constitutional right to lie about receiving the Congressional 
Medal of Honor,8 although not a right to commit fraud (e.g., by 
using deceptive speech to take money under false pretenses). 
Those who receive government grants even have a free speech 
right to receive these subsidies while rejecting a government 
requirement that they affirm in their award documents that they 
are “opposed to prostitution . . . .”9 
 
 5 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366–67 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445, 449 (1969) (per curiam). 
 6 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). The Court did not 
invalidate, on its face, the statute (8 U.S.C. § 871(a)) which prohibits threats against the 
President. It did overturn the conviction, directed an acquittal, and explained that the 
government must prove more than that the defendant said the forbidden words. See id. at 
707. “[A] statute such as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be 
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat 
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at 707–08. 
“Hundreds of celebrity howlers threaten the President of the United States every 
year, sometimes because they disagree with his policies, but more often just because he is 
the President”—yet there is no prosecution. STALKING, THREATENING, AND ATTACKING 
PUBLIC FIGURES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 111 (J. Reid Meloy, 
Lorraine Sheridan & Jens Hoffmann eds., 2008). 
 7 There are a few categories of speech that the Court historically has not protected, 
such as “obscenity” and “defamation,” both terms of art that are narrowly defined. New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 271–74 (1964) (analyzing “defamation” and 
“knowing falsehood” about public officials); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973) 
(defining obscenity as “patently offensive representations . . . of ultimate sexual acts” that 
lack “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). Such decisions, however, do 
nothing to undercut the protection the First Amendment gives to hateful speech. 
 8 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012). This case made clear 
that there are very few constitutional content-based restrictions on free speech:  
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted . . . only when confined 
to the few “‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] . . . . Among these 
categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to incite lawless action, obscenity, 
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called “fighting words,” child 
pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent 
threat the government has the power to prevent . . . . 
Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted). 
 9 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 210, 221 (2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Roberts, for the Court, held that the Agency 
for International Development’s (AID) requirement violated the First Amendment because it 
compels, as a condition of federal funding, recipients to affirm a belief that, by its nature, 
cannot be confined within the scope of the government program. Id. There is a constitutional 
distinction between (1) conditions that define the limits of the government spending program 
(that is, they specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize) and (2) conditions that try to 
leverage funding “to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.” Id. at 214–15. 
The law may require that the grantee may not use federal funds to promote or 
advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution. Id. at 218. However, the government’s 
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When the Court allows prohibitions of some speech, such as 
perjury, it makes clear that it is speech plus something else.10 If I 
hold a gun to your head and say, “give me your money or your 
life,” I’m engaging in conduct (robbery) accompanied by words. If 
I say, “I wish I had Bill Gates’ money,” or, “I hate the idle rich,” I 
am just engaging in speech. 
Another example is speech that proposes an illegal 
commercial transaction. If it is illegal to hire an assassin, the law 
can make it illegal to publish an advertisement that says, 
“Wanted: A hitman; no questions asked.”11 
Similarly, a law that prohibits aiding and abetting a 
“foreign terrorist organization,” can apply to a group that uses 
speech to support the lawful and nonviolent purposes of the 
terrorist organization because the law does not ban “pure 
political speech. . . .”12 It bans speech plus, that is, speech used 
in connection with an activity in order to help the terrorist 
group under the direction of that group.  
An organization or individual can say or advocate whatever 
they want. They can argue, if they wish, that Hamas is a good 
organization and its methods are justified. That is independent 
advocacy. However, the Court upheld a statute limiting speech 
that aided foreign terrorists because it did not limit pure speech. 
It “reaches only material support coordinated with or under the 
direction of a designated foreign terrorist organization. 
Independent advocacy that might be viewed as promoting the 
 
second requirement is invalid, because it improperly leverages funding. Id. at 215–16. It 
requires a funding recipient to “espouse a specific belief as its own.” Id. at 219. This Policy 
Requirement, “by its very nature” affects speech outside the scope of the federally funded 
program. Id. at 218. It “goes beyond preventing” grantees from using private funds in a 
way that would undermine the federal program. Id. at 220. “It requires them to pledge 
allegiance to the [g]overnment’s policy of eradicating prostitution.” Id. This “Policy 
Requirement compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by 
its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the [g]overnment program.” Id. 
 10 “It is not simply because perjured statements are false that they lack First 
Amendment protection.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720. When the Court allows civil or criminal 
penalties for “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a 
false statement” there is speech plus something else, “such as an invasion of privacy or 
the costs of vexatious litigation.” Id. at 719. Perjury, that is, intentionally introducing 
false evidence, interferes with a trial in the same way that an action, such as introducing 
a forged document, interferes with a fair trial. Id. at 720. As the Court said in United 
States v. Dunnigan, “[t]o uphold the integrity of our trial system . . . the constitutionality 
of perjury statutes is unquestioned.” 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993). 
 11 It is not “an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct 
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by  
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & 
Instit. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 
336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). 
 12 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28–29 (2010). 
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group’s legitimacy is not covered.”13 Congress may enact this 
statute to prevent terrorist organizations like Hamas from using 
“its overt political and charitable organizations as a financial and 
logistical support network for its terrorist operations.”14 
The government cannot limit the speaker simply because the 
audience is upset with the words spoken. There is no longer any 
heckler’s veto, even when the speaker spews forth hate. Thus, the 
Nazis have a constitutional right to march through Skokie, 
Illinois, a town that the American Nazis chose specifically 
because a large number of Holocaust survivors lived there.15 The 
point of the Nazi march was to impose psychic harm—yet the 
First Amendment still protected it.16 
In order to understand modern speech doctrine, where 
people have a right to lie, to march celebrating Nazi hate, to 
advocate anarchy, to accept federal money while rejecting some 
of the conditions attached to it—to know how we arrived here, 
with substantially more free speech rights than Justice Holmes 
would ever have imagined—we have to understand free speech’s 
ancient roots. 
It is more important than ever to understand the intellectual 
rationale of modern free expression, and learn why Justice 
Holmes was wrong, because today, free speech is under renewed 
attack from those who used to be its supporters.  
The usual suspects who reject free speech would include 
terrorists, like those who, in 2015, attacked Charlie Hebdo, the 
satirical French newspaper, and claimed twelve lives.17 To that group 
there is another, more surprising addition—those who intimated that 
Charlie Hebdo had it coming to them. These people argued that those 
who parody should exercise self-censorship if the objects of their 
satire are prone to violence.18 In other words, blame the victim. 
 
 13 Id. at 31–32.  
 14 Id. at 31 (quoting MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM 
IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD 2 (2006)). 
 15 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198–200 (7th Cir. 1978). The members of the 
National Socialist Party of America, clothed with the swastika and other symbols of the 
Nazis, planned to march in front of the Village Hall in Skokie, a Chicago suburb with a large 
Jewish population, including several thousand survivors of the Holocaust. Id. The court 
invalidated various attempts to forbid the march, including ordinance No. “995,” prohibiting 
the dissemination of any materials promoting and inciting racial hatred. Id. at 1207. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Ronald D. Rotunda, Je Suis Charlie Hebdo, VERDICT (Feb. 16, 2015), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/02/16/je-suis-charlie-hebdo?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign= 
wordtwit&utm_medium=web [http://perma.cc/N2TL-UUDM]. 
 18 See, e.g., Erik Wemple, On CNN, Jay Carney Sticks to Position that Charlie Hebdo 
Should Have Pulled Back, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/01/08/on-cnn-jay-carney-sticks-to-position-that-charlie-hebdo-
should-have-pulled-back/?utm_term=.28144e322e05 [http://perma.cc/JA74-JJ5B]; Charles Lane, 
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What is even more troubling is that to the list of usual 
suspects, we must add some unusual suspects—those who think 
of themselves as liberal and supportive of free speech yet justify 
restriction to prohibit what they regard as hateful or hurtful 
speech. That group is more worrisome, because its members used 
to be the champions of free speech.  
Our universities are educating the leaders of tomorrow. 
These future leaders do not believe in free speech. We know from 
news reports that when university students do not agree with a 
viewpoint of a speaker, the students protest, sometimes 
violently.19 Recent surveys show that the protestors are not 
merely a small but vocal minority. Instead, they are a majority.20 
If we survey Democrats, Republicans, or Independents, fewer 
than half think the First Amendment protects speech the students 
regard as “hate speech.”21 A significant number of students, 
regardless of political affiliation, believe it is completely 
appropriate for students to disrupt a speaker so that no one in the 
audience can hear him or her.22 One-fifth of all college students 
believe that violence is appropriate to prevent the speaker from 
being able to speak at all.23 In 1984, twenty percent of college 
students thought that universities should ban speakers they 
considered extreme.24 By 2015, that percentage more than doubled 
to forty-three percent.25 
 
Charlie Hebdo’s Editors Took Big Risks to Defend Freedom of Expression ,  
WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-lane-charlie-
hebdos-editors-took-risks-to-defend-the-freedom-of-expression/2015/01/07/8b4a3782-9694-11e4-
927a-4fa2638cd1b0_story.html?utm_term=.819dfad16d51 [http://perma.cc/3Y4S-6K57]. 
 19 See Lisa Rathke, US colleges confront a new era of sometimes-violent protest, AP 
NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/116336dc947e4e8faba1d5ccd1805398/US-
colleges-confront-a-new-era-of-sometimes-violent-protest [http://perma.cc/G9RL-AZ27]. 
 20 See John Villasenor, Views among college students regarding the First 
Amendment: Results from a new survey , BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/09/18/views-among-college-students-regarding-
the-first-amendment-results-from-a-new-survey/ [http://perma.cc/NQK7-5NH2]. 
 21 Id. (finding only thirty-nine percent of students surveyed believe hate speech 
is protected). 
 22 Id. (finding fifty-one percent of students surveyed agreed with the statement “A 
student group opposed to the speaker disrupts the speech by loudly and repeatedly  
shouting so that the audience cannot hear the speaker. Do you agree or disagree that the 
student group’s actions are acceptable?”). 
 23 Id. (finding nineteen percent of students agreed with the statement “A student 
group opposed to the speaker uses violence to prevent the speaker from speaking. Do you 
agree or disagree that the student group’s actions are acceptable?”). 
 24 See Jean M. Twenge, The Smartphone Generation vs. Free Speech, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 1, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-smartphone-generation-vs-
free-speech-1504274890. 
 25 See id.; see also Jean M. Twenge, Review --- The Smartphone Generation vs. Free 
Speech --- Risk-Averse and Unaccustomed to Independence, they Flee From the ‘Hurt’ of Words, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2017, at C.3; JEAN M. TWENGE, iGEN: WHY TODAY’S SUPER-CONNECTED 
KIDS ARE GROWING UP LESS REBELLIOUS, MORE TOLERANT, LESS HAPPY—AND COMPLETELY 
UNPREPARED FOR ADULTHOOD 252 (2017). 
Do Not Delete 5/29/2019 2:36 PM 
324 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
Instead of being bastions of free discourse, many universities 
are now politically correct. Take Iowa State University for 
example. Last year, it required its students to waive their free 
speech rights. It explicitly told its students that they must agree, 
in order to graduate, that the University can punish speech it 
regards as “harassment” even though the student is “[e]ngaging 
in First Amendment protected speech activities.”26 The inevitable 
lawsuit followed, and the university settled and agreed to change 
its ways.27 As the verified complaint explained—quoting the Iowa 
State University’s “Student Disciplinary Regulations”—the 
University’s “Discriminatory Harassment” policy prohibits 
students from engaging in “unwelcome behavior” on the basis of 
specific classifications, including religion, and confirms that 
“[e]ngaging in First Amendment protected speech activities” may 
be deemed harassment “depending upon the circumstances.”28 
In law schools nowadays, it is common for constitutional law 
professors to teach that there are many limits to the First 
Amendment. Often, they begin a course on free speech by quoting 
Justice Holmes, explaining that protection for free speech requires 
“balance,” and then justifying whatever restrictions they would 
like to impose. Although the First Amendment provides that 
Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press,”29 it does not really mean “no law”—that is how the 
argument goes and its proponents use it to justify banning hate 
speech, politically incorrect speech, and hurtful speech.30 
Others to add to the list of those who reject First Amendment 
values are some lower courts.31 They do not acknowledge the modern 
vigorous protections for unpopular speech perhaps because they do 
 
 26 Verified Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 124, 133, Dunn v. Leath, 
No. 4:16-CV-00553-JAJ-CFB (S.D. Iowa Oct. 17, 2016). 
 27 The University settled and changed its policies in 2017. See Settlement Agreement 
& Release at 2, Dunn v. Leath, No. 4:16-CV-00553-JAJ-CFB (S.D. Iowa Oct. 17, 2016). 
 28 Verified Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 26, ¶ 133.  
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 30 Professor and Judge Richard Posner frankly adopts a balancing test in First 
Amendment cases. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 67 (2001) 
(“[S]peech should be allowed if but only if its benefits equal or exceed its costs discounted by 
their probability and by their futurity, and reduced by the costs of administering a ban.”). 
See also Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (“I insist that bullfighting is an expressive activity,” but the state can still forbid 
it “because in American society its harmful consequences are thought to outweigh its 
expressive value”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 31 See, e.g., Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 767, 770 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that a public school could prohibit students from wearing a symbol of 
the American Flag on their clothing because doing so might upset some Mexican 
American students); Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 233 (6th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (overruling the panel which had upheld a heckler’s veto). 
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not understand the modern rationale for free speech—a rationale 
that traces its ancestry to ancient roots.  
Typically, these people—university administrators, university 
students, law school professors, lower courts, modern pundits—go 
on to agree that the restrictions on free speech that occurred in 
an earlier time were wrong and were not justified at the time, 
but—there is always a “but”—today is different.  
Justice Frankfurter is a typical example of this 
phenomenon, and the vehicle he used to justify his position is 
his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, in which the 
Court upheld the conviction of the defendants for violating the 
Smith Act.32 Dennis came down in 1951, in the midst of the 
second Red Scare, which lasted from about 1947 to mid-1950s.33 
It was the heyday of McCarthyism. 
Justice Frankfurter agreed that the government overreacted to 
the first Red Scare, in the 1920s, but the government, he said, is not 
overreacting to the second Red Scare, which he was living through.34 
Justice Frankfurter took “judicial notice” of the ascendancy 
of the Communist doctrine in the 1950s because it was, to him, a 
matter of “common knowledge,” and that knowledge “would 
amply justify a legislature in concluding that recruitment of 
additional members for the [Communist] Party would create a 
substantial danger to national security.”35 What the Court is 
doing now, said Justice Frankfurter, is not like what the Court 
did in Gitlow v. New York, when it upheld a state conviction for 
“criminal anarchy.”36 Justice Frankfurter would require: 
[E]xcessive tolerance of the legislative judgment to suppose that the 
Gitlow publication in the circumstances could justify serious concern. 
In contrast, there is ample justification for a legislative judgment that 
the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat to national order 
and security.37  
In contemporary America, many of those who ridicule both 
the first and the second Red Scare of yesteryear have no problem 
attacking unpopular speech today, banning it, or limiting it to 
certain “zones” with trigger warnings to protect the sensitive.  
 
 32 341 U.S. 494, 541–42 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 33 See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 3 
(1991); see also MICHAEL J. HEALE, MCCARTHY’S AMERICANS: RED SCARE POLITICS IN 
STATE AND NATION, 1935–1965, at 2 (1998); LANDON R. Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED 
SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT 1 (2012). 
 34 See generally David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on 
Terrorism, 38 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 22 (2003). 
 35 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 36 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654, 670 (1925). 
 37 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 541–42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Like Justice Frankfurter, they say, “This time it’s different. The 
prior generation overreacted, but what we are doing now is 
justified.” That is the way the argument goes, and each 
generation that justifies restrictions uses it. 
The universities, which used to be the citadels of free 
speech—think of the University of California, Berkeley, famous 
for its “free speech movement” in the 1960s38—are now famous 
for limiting free speech.39 Courts now justify banning students 
from wearing t-shirts with the American Flag because showing it 
might upset those who see it.40 In this new legal regime, we have 
a right to burn the flag41 but not to display it.  
Justice Frankfurter’s false distinction between the first Red 
Scare and the second one, as well as Berkeley’s free speech 
turnaround, should teach us that each generation must re-learn 
the importance of free speech, even rebellious speech in time of 
war, even speech that promotes hate, or advocates anarchy. And 
to re-learn that lesson, we must start with the ancient Greeks. 
II. PERICLES AND THE BIRTH OF FREE SPEECH 
Over 2400 years ago, in the cradle of democracy, the people of 
Athens believed that freedom of speech made their armies more 
courageous, and that free speech made them stronger, not weaker. 
Their philosophers, historians, and playwrights crafted the first 
arguments favoring free speech and opposing government 
regulation, even in time of war. The primary ancient Greek figures, 
along with Pericles, were Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aeschylus. 
Herodotus wrote the Histories, his History of the Persian 
Wars (499–479 BC), in nine books. We sometimes refer to 
Herodotus as the father of history.42 Before Herodotus, people 
wrote history in the sense of chronicling events, writing lists 
(there was a battle; a king lost; another king sealed his victory by 
a propitious marriage, and so forth). Herodotus was different: He 
was interested in why things happened; what caused nations or 
 
 38 See ROBERT COHEN, FREEDOM’S ORATOR: MARIO SAVIO AND THE RADICAL LEGACY 
OF THE 1960s 82 (2009). 
 39 John Woodrow Cox, Berkeley Gave Birth to the Free Speech Movement in the 
1960s. Now, Conservatives are Demanding it Include Them, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/04/20/berkeley-gave-birth-to-
the-free-speech-movement-in-the-1960s-now-conservatives-are-demanding-it-include-
them/?utm_term=.2e7f010e6538 [http://perma.cc/5TQH-S5H3]. 
 40 See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 774–75 (9th Cir. 
2014). Discussed infra. 
 41 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 
U.S. 310, 312 (1990). 
 42 J. A. S. Evans, Father of History or Father of Lies: The Reputation of Herodotus, 64 
CLASSICAL J. 11 (1968). 
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leaders to do one thing or another.43 Our word, “history” comes 
from the Greek wording meaning “inquiry” or “investigation.”44 
Admittedly, he relied on oral recollections, rumors, and legends, 
which is why others call him the father of lies.45 
Herodotus sought to understand and explain why Athenians 
could win victories over the more numerous Persians in the first 
part of the fifth century BC46 His answer was that Athenians 
fought as free people, not as slaves.47 It is not that the Athenians 
were braver than the Persians were, or that their archers were 
more accurate, or their weapons more advanced. Instead, 
Herodotus argued, when the Athenians were under despotic 
rulers, they “were no better in war than any of their neighbors, 
yet once they got quit of despots they were far and away the first 
of all,” because “when they were freed each man was zealous to 
achieve for himself.”48 Freedom made the Athenians braver. 
In contrast to Herodotus, Thucydides wrote about the history 
of events that occurred during his lifetime.49 He sought to 
confirm facts through eyewitness accounts and written records. 
Yet his histories were no transcript of what people said. In his 
History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides included long 
speeches that historical figures might have delivered.50 
Thucydides tells us that a custom of the times was for a 
prominent figure to give a funeral oration.  
In Book 2 of his History, he gives us the famous Funeral 
Oration of Pericles. Although one might think that Thucydides 
presents this speech as if it were a verbatim transcript of 
Pericles’ discourse, Thucydides does not pretend that it is so. 
Instead, he said the words represent what Pericles intended, 
what he could have said, what was “called for in the situation.”51 
The Funeral Oration indicates free speech was not merely a 
theory of a few academicians. Democratically elected political 
leaders were also embracing it. Pericles delivered his speech as a 
 
 43 See id. at 12. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. at 11; see also DONALD LATEINER, THE HISTORICAL METHOD OF HERODOTUS 
8–9 (1989); DAVID SACKS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD 155 (Lisa R. 
Brody ed., 2005). 
 46 LATEINER, supra note 45, at 182. 
 47 Id. 
 48 I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 50 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
 49 See Julia Kindt, Guide to the Classics: Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian 
War, CONVERSATION (June 12, 2017, 3:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-
classics-thucydidess-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war-71550 [http://perma.cc/ZZZ6-HGUL]. 
 50 See id. 
 51 ALAN RYAN, ON POLITICS: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM HERODOTUS 
TO THE PRESENT 23 (2012). 
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tribute to those who died in the war that year.52 When he spoke, 
the first year of Peloponnesian War was just ending.53  
Thucydides tells us that Pericles argued that the Athenians 
were stronger because they were free. Athens was not a formidable 
city-state in spite of free speech but because of free speech. Pericles’ 
famous funeral oration argued: 
Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner 
or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if 
revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management 
or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands False The great 
impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of 
knowledge that is gained by discussion preparatory to action.54 
Pericles does not focus on the achievements of Athens’ military. 
Instead, he praises the Athenian form of government and its 
protection of free speech.55 
The final ancient figure justifying free speech as essential to 
democracy is the playwright, Aeschylus. His play, The Persians, 
echoed Herodotus and Thucydides.56 He wrote it in 472 BC That 
same year, this play won first prize at the dramatic competitions 
in the City Dionysia festival of Athens.57 Remember that at this 
time, in contrast to little city-state of Athens, dictators and kings 
ruled the rest of the world. 
Aeschylus explained that the Athenians were victorious 
because, “[o]f no man are they the slaves or subjects.”58 Art 
reflects life, and Aeschylus, in his play, reflected what many 
Athenians believed: Athenians should celebrate their victory not 
as a victory of Greeks over Persians, but as a victory of free men 
over slaves. “The victors at Salamis were men elevated and 
inspired by the freedom to speak their minds and govern 
themselves.”59 The Persians outnumbered the Greeks, but the 
Greeks won a decisive victory led by Themistocles, a 
non-aristocratic Athenian politician and general. 
Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, along with political 
leaders like Pericles, all embraced this ancient truth: People who 
are free are people who work more intensely because they work 
 
 52 See Kindt, supra note 49. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Pericles, Funeral Oration, in BENJAMIN JOWETT, THUCYDIDES 116, 118–19 
(Clarendon Press, 1881). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See Tim Rood, Thucydides’ Persian Wars, in OXFORD READINGS IN THUCYDIDES 
168–69 (Jeffrey S. Rusten ed., 2009).  
 57 See AMNON KABATCHNIK, BLOOD ON THE STAGE: 480 B.C. TO 1600 A.D. 4 (2014). 
The Persians is the first play in recorded history that contains a ghost scene. Id.  
 58 STONE, supra note 48, at 51 (quoting 2 AESCHYLUS, PLAYS). 
 59 Id. 
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for themselves, not for a master.60 It is for the same reason that 
it takes many hunting dogs to catch one fox: The fox works 
harder because he is self-employed.  
The countries of the world were slow to learn this lesson. 
When the United States began its experiment with democracy, it 
was also slow to learn. It took nearly two centuries before we 
broadly embraced the principle that free speech and the right to 
dissent are essential for a free people, even in wartime. The road 
to the modern legal protections was not straight and narrow.  
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whom the liberals of his day 
idolized, did free speech no favor with his advocacy of the “clear 
and present danger” test. In fact, the Supreme Court has typically 
used the “clear and present danger” test to uphold a criminal 
prosecution of speech.61 In contrast, the modern Court now follows 
the path that Pericles and the Greek philosophers first walked. 
While there will always be those who call for prosecutions of 
those who spew hate, history has taught us that the best 
response for the speech we do not like is more speech, not less. 
How we moved from the “clear and present danger” test to the 
modern, more robust protection for hate speech and political 
dissent offers an important historical lesson. This lesson is 
important, not only because it tells us how we reached the 
contemporary view, but also reveals why our journey was so slow. 
When we understand the rationale to protect hateful speech, we 
will be less likely to repeat the mistakes of the past. 
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
The Framers were conversant with the Greek philosophers 
as well as the classical Roman and European philosophers.62 
Reflecting the political theories of the ancients, the Framers created 
the “separation of powers” by dividing power between the states and 
the federal government (vertical separation), and among three 
branches of the federal government (horizontal separation).63  
The original Constitution created the various branches of the 
central government and divided power between the central 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 As Justice Douglas’s concurrence explained in Brandenburg v. Ohio, “My own 
view is quite different. I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any ‘clear 
and present danger’ test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling 
as the Court in Dennis rephrased it.” 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 62 See generally CARL J. RICHARD, GREEKS & ROMANS BEARING GIFTS: HOW THE 
ANCIENTS INSPIRED THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2008). 
 63 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Vertical Federalism, the New States’ Rights, and the  
Wisdom of Crowds, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 307, 307–08 (2016). 
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government and the states––those were the structural protections. 
Other than these structural safeguards, the Framers imposed few 
direct limitations on the government. The original Constitution 
guarantees only a few important rights. It prohibits any religious test 
for any office—state or federal64—a restriction that was very 
progressive for its time. The original Constitution also guarantees the 
right to a jury trial in criminal cases.65 It prohibits Congress from 
suspending the right of habeas corpus, or from enacting any ex post 
facto law or bill of attainder.66 It also forbids states from enacting any 
bill of attainder or ex post facto law.67 To protect reasonable 
expectations, the original Constitution forbids states from impairing 
the obligation of contracts.68 Yet, it had no bill of rights. 
 When the Framers lobbied the people urging them to approve 
the new Constitution, many were concerned that the structural 
protections of federalism and the few direct limits in the 
Constitution were not enough. They feared that the government 
could use its powers to restrict freedoms that the people assumed 
to exist but to which the Constitution did not refer.69 
For example, the body of the Constitution does not give the 
central government any power to regulate the press or speech. 
However, Congress does have the power to declare war,70 and the 
President has the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces.71 Congress, when the nation is at war, has the 
power to wage war effectively. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
augments these express powers with implied powers—the power 
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”72 Could Congress 
use the war power to limit free speech in time of war? Prohibiting 
criticism of a war by people within the United States may make it 
easier to conduct a more effective war against foreign enemies. 
Because the proposed Constitution had few limits, some 
people who favored it were worried that it did not explicitly grant 
 
 64 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 65 See id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 66 See id.; id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2–3. 
 67 See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2–3; id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 68 Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
427–28 (1934) (explaining that the Contract Clause was adopted to give predictability to the 
business of society). 
 69 See infra. 
 70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 71 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 72 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause greatly increases federal power by authorizing 
implied powers. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418–20 (1819). 
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more protections. The Framers responded to these pressures by 
promising that once the Constitution went into effect, the first 
Congress would propose a Bill of Rights.73 The politicians 
actually kept their promise: The first Congress under the new 
Constitution promptly proposed, on September 25, 1789, what we 
now call the Bill of Rights.74 It granted more individual freedoms, 
though these rights did not limit the states until after the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 
The Bill of Rights gave us the First Amendment, protecting 
freedom of speech and press.76 Some modern constitutions have 
provisions that suspend constitutional rights in times of public 
danger. For example, the South African Constitution, which 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has praised,77 devotes 970 words to 
an article dedicated to suspending rights, including free speech.78 
There is a table of “non-derogable rights,” but free speech is not 
one of them.79 In contrast, the First Amendment speaks in 
broader terms: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”80 There is no provision for 
suspending any rights. 
IV. THE EARLY FIRST AMENDMENT—FROM THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY TO WORLD WAR I 
The first test of the Free Speech Clause was the ill-fated 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Congress enacted those laws in 
 
 73 See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 768–69 (1928). 
 74 See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776–1791, at 
214–15 (1955). 
 75 See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that the 
Bill of Rights only applies to the United States government); see also 2 RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE § 14.2 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state 
governments until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 76 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 77 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Egypt’s Constitutional Do-Over: This Time Around, 
Take a Closer Look at America’s Bill of Rights , WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323740804578601383340547860. 
 78 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 37. 
 79 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Model, Resource, or Outlier? What Effect has the U.S. 
Constitution had on the Recently Adopted Constitutions of Other Nations?, Panel Discussion 
hosted by the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 11, 2012), in THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, May 17, 
2013, at 12, 15, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/05/model-resource-or-outlier-
what-effect-has-the-us-constitution-had-on-the-recently-adopted-constitutions-of-other-nations 
[http://perma.cc/5F2R-MNAT]. “Consider the South African constitution. The title of Article 37 
is ‘States of Emergency.’ This one article, dedicated to suspending rights under various 
circumstances, is 970 words long. This one article is more than [twenty] percent of the length of 
the entire U.S. Constitution of 1787. Article 37 has a table of ‘non-derogable rights.’ 
Free speech is not one of those.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 80 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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an effort to squelch criticism of President Adams.81 No cases 
reached the Supreme Court, but there were lower court 
prosecutions involving the Sedition Act. At this early time in 
American history, the restrictions that the language of the First 
Amendment imposed (“Congress shall make no law”), appeared 
to be as effective as chains made of parchment. 
Under the Alien Act, the President could order all aliens “as 
he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United 
States” to leave the country.82 The President never formally 
invoked this law, and it expired after two years, but its existence 
did result in some aliens leaving the country or going into hiding.83 
Its companion law, the Sedition Act, prohibited “publishing any 
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the 
government of the United States, or either house of Congress . . . or 
the President . . . with intent to defame . . . or to bring them . . . into 
contempt or disrepute . . . .”84 In spite of these prohibitions, the law 
was relatively tolerant for its time: It allowed the defendant to use 
truth as a defense to a prosecution; and it gave the defendant a jury 
trial; and it authorized the jury to determine the law and facts 
under the direction of the court.85  
In contrast, England did not establish a defense of truth 
until 1843.86 Before that, supporters of sedition laws argued, 
“[t]he greater the truth, the greater the libel.”87 The fact that the 
criticism was true made it more dangerous, because people are 
more likely to believe the truth. Truthful criticism is more likely 
to undermine government authority.88 Moreover, if you say 
something is true, you cannot retract it without lying. Our 
sedition law, measured against the English prohibitions, was 
moderately enlightened for its time. 
President Adams used the Sedition Act against members of 
Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party for their 
 
 81 See Alien and Sedition Acts, HISTORY (last updated Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/alien-and-sedition-acts [http://perma.cc/TEV4-BKAR]. 
 82 Alien Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570–71 (1798). 
 83 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.5 (5th ed. 2012). 
 84 Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 85 Id. § 3. 
 86 See Libel Act 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (Eng.); see also 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 383 (London, MacMillan and Co. 1883). 
England did allow the jury to return a general verdict during this period. See Fox’s Libel Act 
1792, 32 Geo. 3, c. 60. 
 87 2 HENRY SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY AND OTHER 
SUBJECTS 516 (Fac. of L. Nw. Univ. ed., 1921). This maxim is typically attributed to Lord 
Mansfield, William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
PROVERBS 136 (Jennifer Speake ed., 2003). 
 88 See id.  
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criticism of his administration.89 Jefferson objected to the 
Sedition Act, but his actions were hardly a paean to free speech.90 
When he assumed the presidency, he urged his supporters to use 
state laws, rather than federal law, to keep the press in line.91 
Thus, he pressed the Governor of Pennsylvania to institute a 
“few [selected] prosecutions” of those newspapers who attacked 
the Jeffersonians.92 
The First Amendment’s protections, initially, were chains 
made of parchment because the federal government enforced the 
Sedition Act, although no case involving the Sedition Act ever 
worked its way to the Supreme Court. Historians today agree 
that this law would not survive constitutional scrutiny. 
The Sedition Act “crystallized a national awareness of the 
central meaning of the First Amendment.”93 After the Sedition Act 
expired,94 a different Congress enacted a law to repay the fines that 
the government had levied against violators of the Sedition Act, 
because it considered the law unconstitutional.95 When Thomas 
Jefferson became President, he pardoned those whom courts had 
convicted and sentenced under the Act. He said, “I discharged every 
person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, 
because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as 
absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down 
and worship a golden image . . . .”96  
Decades later, on February 4, 1836, Senator Calhoun, speaking 
to the U.S. Senate, said that the unconstitutionality of the Sedition 
Act was a matter “which no one now doubts.”97 Over the years, 
various Justices, in case law98 or their other writings,99 have 
 
 89 LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 58–59 
(Ivan R. Dee, Inc. ed., Elephant Paperbacks 1989) (1963).  
 90 See id.  
 91 See e.g., Ryan Mattimore, Presidential Feuds With the Media Are Nothing New, 
History (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/presidents-relationship-with-press. 
 92 LEVY, supra note 89. 
 93 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). 
 94 The Act, by its own terms, expired in 1801. Sedition Act, ch. 74, §4, 1 Stat. 597 (1798). 
 95 See Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 802; H.R. REP. NO. 26-86, at 2 (1840). 
 96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 4 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS BIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, 
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 555–56 (H. A. 
Washington ed., 1854). 
 97 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (quoting S. REP. NO. 24-122, at 3 (1836)). 
 98 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by 
Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288–89 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. 
 99 See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 47 (Doubleday and Co. 1958). 
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volunteered that this law violated the First Amendment. Classical 
constitutional law commentators came to a similar conclusion.100 
After the sad experience of the enforcement of the Sedition 
Law, there was little activity raising free speech issues until 
World War I. The federal government, particularly during the 
Civil War,101 occasionally tried to punish critical speech, but the 
Supreme Court had no important role to play.102 That all changed 
with America’s entry into World War I. The Supreme Court came 
out of hibernation. 
V. THE BIRTH OF SHOUTING “FIRE” IN A CROWDED THEATRE: 
WORLD WAR I AND ITS AFTERMATH  
The politicians of the early twentieth century forgot our 
experience with the Alien and Sedition Acts of the early 
eighteenth century. Congress, in response to the domestic 
political unrest that greeted America’s entrance into World War 
I, passed the Espionage Act of 1917103 and the Sedition Act of 
1918.104 These laws did not respect the right to dissent in time of 
war. Cases that the government brought under this legislation 
reached the Supreme Court for the first time.105 The Court then 
developed standards for approaching First Amendment rights at 
a time when the nation was at war. The climate was not 
conducive to any expansive reading of the free speech guarantee. 
The Court, like the politicians, forgot the Greek philosophers and 
the historical lessons of the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
 
 100 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN UNION 899–900 (8th 
ed., Carrington, 1927); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 17–28 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1954) (1941). 
 101 See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and the Anti-War Speech in the 
Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105 (1998) (discussing the arrest by Union soldiers of 
Clement L. Vallandigham, a former Democratic congressman, because of his anti-war 
speech of May 1, 1863). Vallendigham said the purpose of the war was not to save the Union 
but to free the slaves and sacrifice liberty to “King Lincoln.” Id. at 123. That arrest started a 
debate about the role of free speech in time of war. Vallandigham sued for release under 
habeas corpus, but the Supreme Court said it had no jurisdiction to issue the writ to a 
military commission. See Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253 (1863). 
 102 See Alexis Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870–1915, 
24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 64 (1980); see also David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its 
Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 516, 581–82 (1981); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of 
Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1227–29 (1983); Howard Owen 
Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 
1791–1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59, 72–73 (1986); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS 
FORGOTTEN YEARS 1 (1999). 
 103 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217. 
 104 Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1920). 
 105 See generally Marcie K. Cowley, Red Scare, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1063/red-scare [http://perma.cc/7K7B-T36F]. 
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In 1919, the Supreme Court handed down two important 
decisions involving free speech issues, Schenck v. United States106 
and Abrams v. United States.107 In the first case, the Court 
introduces the “clear and present danger” test.108 In both, the 
Court denied any protection for speech.109 
A. Schenck v. United States: Shouting Fire in a Theatre 
In Schenck, the Court affirmed the defendants’ conviction for 
conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917.110 The year was 
1919. The great Red Scare (later called the first Red Scare) had 
begun, reacting to Communist successes in Russia and Eastern 
Europe.111 Feeding this fear were bomb-throwing anarchists, plus 
the growing popularity of the Industrial Workers of the World112 
(an international radical industrial labor organization). In 
January 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer launched a 
gigantic two-year Red witch-hunt, complete with mass arrests 
without benefit of habeas corpus, hasty prosecutions, and mass 
deportation of Communists and other radicals.113 
However, the Schenck defendants harangued no crowd, 
threw no bombs, and made no threats.114 Instead, they merely 
mailed leaflets to men eligible for military service, and argued 
that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
prohibits involuntary servitude (slavery).115 These leaflets, the 
government argued, violated the Espionage Act, which prohibited 
obstruction of military recruiting.116 
Nowadays, we think of Justice Holmes’s opinions as a hymn 
to free speech. He was the darling of the liberals of his day, and 
the perception that he believed in free speech was a major reason 
for his popularity.117 Ironically, Justice Holmes was a Social 
 
 106 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 107 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 108 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.  
 109 Id. at 52–53; Abrams, 250 U.S. 623–24. 
 110 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 53. 
 111 See Cowley, supra note 105.  
 112 See Industrial Workers of the World, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (last 
updated June 15, 2015), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Industrial-Workers-of-the-World 
[http://perma.cc/B5HW-4RQZ]. 
 113 See, e.g., 2 ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 690 (4th ed. 1970). 
 114 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–51. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.  
 117 See Elizabeth R. Purdy, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., FIRST AMEND. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1337/oliver-wendell-holmes-jr 
[http://perma.cc/A66L-GAU2] (“[Justice Holmes] was viewed as a civil libertarian who  
protected the First Amendment from encroachments, particularly during World War I and 
the period of hostility to dissent that followed the war.”). 
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Darwinist—a cynical believer in the survival of the fittest.118 He 
did not believe in progressive taxation, or social reform, or in 
antitrust enforcement. Although he fought in the Civil War and 
had an abolitionist background, the plight of black people did not 
move him.119 Justice Holmes was “an atheist, a materialist, a 
behaviorist and a resolute enemy of natural law.”120 
Only seven months before the parties argued the Schenck 
case before the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes shared an 
interesting train ride with Judge Learned Hand, which 
resulted in them exchanging correspondence.121 In his letter of 
June 24, 1918, Justice Holmes actually declared to Judge 
Learned Hand:  
[F]ree speech stands no differently than freedom of vaccination. The 
occasions would be rarer when you cared enough to stop it but if for any 
reason you did care enough you wouldn’t care a damn for the suggestion 
that you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might be wrong.122  
The following year, Justice Holmes, writing for the Schenck 
Court, upheld the convictions and the restraint on freedom of 
expression.123 He claimed that the convictions were necessary to 
prevent grave and immediate threats to national security.124 
Ordinarily, Justice Holmes believed, leaflets should be 
constitutionally protected, but— 
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it 
is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect 
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does 
not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that 
may have all the effect of force. The question in every case is whether 
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is 
a question of proximity and degree.125 
 
 118 See generally Seth Vannatta, Justice Holmes the Social Darwinist, 4 PLURALIST 
78 (2019).  
 119 See id. at 81, 89. 
 120 See Richard A. Posner, Bookshelf: Star of the Legal Stage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 
1989, at A9. 
 121 See Frederic R. Kellogg, Learned Hand and the Great Train Ride, 56 AM. SCHOLAR 
471, 480–81 (1987).  
 122 Id.; see also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1870–1920, 
at 293 (Arthur McEvoy & Christopher Tomlins eds., 1997). 
 123 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919).  
 124 Id. at 52.  
 125 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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Justice Holmes concluded that First Amendment protection 
should not protect speech that hindered the war effort.126 That 
presents a “clear and present danger.”127 
Justice Holmes’s conclusion does not flow from his hypothetical, 
which we should examine in detail. He said: 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.128 
We should ask, why not? Notice that Justice Holmes limits the 
prosecution to the speaker who is speaking falsely. That is his only 
limitation, and it certainly makes sense. If there really is a fire in a 
theatre, should we not tell others about it? Or, do we quietly head 
for the exits and let others burn? There surely is nothing wrong in 
truthfully warning the theatre audience that there is a fire, even if 
many people injure themselves while trying to escape.  
The alternative would be to forbid people from warning others 
about fire. If that were the law, fire alarms would be illegal. Hence, 
the speaker can truthfully shout fire in a crowded theater. Justice 
Holmes seems to assume that, even though shouting of fire will 
cause the same panic. That is the only restriction he imposes on his 
famous hypothetical—that the speaker is speaking falsely. 
Let us consider his facile hypothetical a bit further. What if 
the speaker is speaking falsely but he does not know that it is 
false? The speaker, reasonably believing that there is a fire, will 
 
 126 Id. One week after Justice Holmes wrote the Schenck opinion, he wrote two other 
opinions for the Court affirming convictions in similar cases. In Frohwerk v. United 
States, he stated:  
[T]he First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as 
such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for 
every possible use of language . . . Whatever might be thought of the other 
counts on the evidence, if it were before us, we have decided in Schenck 
v. United States, that a person may be convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct 
recruiting by words of persuasion. 
 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (emphasis removed). 
In Debs v. United States, Justice Holmes also affirmed the conviction of Eugene 
Debs, a prominent Socialist of the time, for allegedly encouraging listeners to obstruct the 
recruiting service. 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). Justice Holmes in this case spoke more in 
common law speech terms, which the Court (but not Justice Holmes) later adopted in 
Abrams and Gitlow, discussed below. Justice Holmes said in the Debs case: 
We should add that the jury were most carefully instructed that they could not 
find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words 
used had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct 
the recruiting service, & c., and unless the defendant had the specific intent to 
do so in his mind. 
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Paul Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 
19 NEW REPUBLIC 13 (1919) (reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 239 (1973)); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition: Professor Ernst Freund 
and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 236–38, 240 (1973). 
 127 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 128 Id. 
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therefore shout a warning. The speaker shouting falsely (but 
reasonably) is not lying—not acting with scienter. Even if there 
is a panic, the government will not punish the person who acts 
reasonably in warning his fellow theatregoers. 
Let us turn to the portion of Justice Holmes’s hypothetical 
where there is a panic. Justice Holmes does not say that the 
speaker knows that he will be causing a panic. Yet, even if Justice 
Holmes meant to impose that limitation—that the speaker is 
knowingly causing a panic—that knowledge should not cause 
liability if the person acts quite reasonably in warning fellow 
theatregoers even though the particular warning happens to be 
incorrect. We install fire alarms so that people can warn others 
without the need to shout, and we do not punish them if they act 
reasonably in triggering the alarm. 
Justice Holmes’s hypothetical does not provide, but must 
assume, that the theatre audience believes the speaker is speaking 
the truth, even if the speaker is speaking falsely. Assume, for 
example, that the ushers were removing a member of the audience 
because he was unruly and talking too loudly. The rest of the 
audience might cheer the miscreant as he is escorted to the exits. If 
this troublemaker starts shouting, “invasion,” “fire,” “flood,” the 
audience would laugh as the ushers escort him to the exits. The 
miscreant was knowingly and falsely shouting fire in a crowded 
theater, but he would not be prosecuted for starting a riot because 
there would be no panic. 
Now assume the speaker knowingly and falsely shouts fire in 
the crowded theatre, but there is no panic because of the 
circumstances. For example, if the audience was watching a play 
or movie, and an actor shouted “fire,” there would be no panic 
because the audience would not believe the speaker even if he 
had the acting ability of Meryl Streep.  
If several members of the audience—perhaps they were 
inattentive because it was a boring play—misunderstood and 
thought that the voice shouting fire was someone in the audience, 
and subsequently panicked, we still would not prosecute the actor 
who was simply playing his part. Think of the “War of the Worlds” 
radio broadcast of Orson Welles. Many of the people who tuned in 
after the show began to think that the Martians were really 
invading New Jersey.129 There were no prosecutions of Orson 
Welles although many people were upset with him.130 
 
 129 See A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, BROADCAST HYSTERIA: ORSON WELLES’S WAR OF THE 
WORLDS AND THE ART OF FAKE NEWS 3–7 (2015). 
 130 See id. at 131–35. 
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Justice Holmes’s “fire in the theatre” hypothetical has another 
important (and unarticulated) qualifier that is not present in his 
conclusion about speech hindering the war effort. The hypothetical 
assumes that there is no time for others to respond to someone who 
falsely shouts “fire.” We cannot normally debate the issue as to 
whether there is a fire because there is no time for debate. The 
circumstances are not conducive to the give and take of normal 
conversation. A fire alarm is not a call to debate. Yet, there was 
plenty of time to debate the assertion of the Schenck defendants 
that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment.  
It is not difficult to imagine a situation where there was time 
to debate, even in the “shout fire” hypothetical. A member of the 
audience shouts “fire,” while pointing to smoke in a corner of the 
stage. An actor on the stage responds, “No need to worry; that’s 
just smoke from dry ice, which the magician will use in the next 
act.” The audience, already rising from their chairs, sits down, 
waits for the next act, and wonders how the magician will use a 
solid form of carbon dioxide in a magic trick. 
The “shouting fire” hypothetical necessarily assumes that there 
is no time for responsive speech. Yet, often there is time. Modern 
courts often say that the best remedy for speech that we do not like 
is more speech, not enforced silence.131 In the free marketplace of 
ideas, we can use speech to persuade others to reject the false 
speech. Justice Holmes’s hypothetical unavoidably assumes that 
there is no time for the marketplace of ideas to work. In the right 
circumstances, shouting the knowingly false words will cause a 
panic, and there will be no time to debate the shouter. In that 
factual situation, falsely pulling the fire alarm is not a call to 
discuss the nature of fire. 
The state may punish someone who knowingly triggers a false 
fire alarm with the intent of causing a panic, thereby causing a 
panic, but there will be no punishment or a substantially less severe 
one if no one hears the alarm because there will be no panic. That is 
also true in the Justice Holmes’s “shouting fire” hypothetical. If the 
audience were composed of deaf people watching a movie with 
closed captions, and our hypothetical malefactor sneaks into the 
theatre and shouts “fire,” there will be no panic. Whatever one 
might prosecute this reprobate for, causing a riot will not be one of 
the counts because there will be no riot. Justice Holmes’s 
hypothetical should be assuming that the audience is ripe to hear 
the words and act on them before anyone can counteract the speech. 
We are talking about the language of incitement. Merely knowingly 
shouting falsely is not enough. 
 
 131 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
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Now, let us think of the speech involved in Schenck—where 
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion upholding the criminal 
prosecution.132 The defendants opposed the war, but speeches 
that oppose war do not fit the hypothetical. Those speeches are 
not like falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre knowing 
that the audience will panic instinctively, because there is no 
time to reason with them.  
The speech in Schenck—or more precisely, the leaflets that 
the defendants mailed to men eligible for military service—could 
not cause a panic, yet Justice Holmes upheld the convictions. 
Those who object to the war protestors can engage them and 
dispute them in the marketplace of ideas. There was plenty of 
time for proponents of the draft to respond to the claims of those 
opposed to the war. There was not even a claim that the 
defendants were lying about anything. They believed what they 
were saying and thus did not have the scienter to lie knowingly. 
They were also not inciting anyone in the sense that the 
rabble-rouser harangues the lynch mob, goading, provoking, or 
prodding the willing crowd to storm the jail immediately. 
In addition, Justice Holmes’s hypothetical does not require that 
the speech be inherently connected with an act that is 
independently criminal. For example, Justice Holmes was not 
talking about a spy who informs the enemy how to break a 
top-secret code. That is speech tied in with an illegal action (aiding 
the enemy in time of war), and one could not rely on the 
marketplace of ideas to counteract the secret actions of a spy. 
Similarly, when someone takes an oath to tell the truth and then 
perjures himself on a material matter, he is not merely talking but 
he is using his words to engage in the act of obstructing justice.133 
Or, if the bank robber passes a note to the teller saying, “This is a 
stick-up,” the writing is connected to an act, an attempted theft. 
B. Abrams v. United States  
In his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, Justice 
Holmes again embraced his “clear and present danger” test and 
tried to explain its application.134 This time, Justice Holmes 
 
 132 See generally Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48.  
 133 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720–21 (2012) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality 
opinion). As Justice Kennedy explained:  
It is not simply because perjured statements are false that they lack First 
Amendment protection. Perjured testimony “is at war with justice” because it 
can cause a court to render a “judgment not resting on truth.” Perjury 
undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the integrity of 
judgments that are the basis of the legal system. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 734–38 (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., concurring). 
 134 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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finally supported free speech but he could not persuade the 
majority to overturn the guilty verdicts.135 The government 
convicted the defendants of conspiracy to violate the Espionage 
Acts amendments,136 which prohibited speech that encouraged 
resistance to the war effort and curtailment of production “with 
intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States 
in the prosecution of the war . . . .”137 At the time, we were at war 
against Germany, but these war protestors were not objecting to 
the war against Germany. Instead, they distributed pamphlets 
criticizing the United States’ involvement in the effort to crush 
Russia’s new communist government.138  
The government was creative in explaining how the efforts of the 
United States in involving itself in Russia’s civil war had anything to 
do with the war against Germany.139 The prosecutors used a chain of 
inferences that reminds us of the nursery rhyme, “This is the house 
that Jack built.” The actual statute involved forbade conspiracies to 
interfere with production of “things necessary to the prosecution of 
war” with the intent to hinder the prosecution of the war.140 The 
theory of the trial court and the Supreme Court majority was that to 
reduce arms production for the Russian fight might aid Germany 
(with whom the United States was at war) because the United States 
would have fewer total arms.141 The Court did not require any 
specific intent by the defendants.142 
The majority in Abrams rejected the free speech defense and 
was unimpressed with Justice Holmes’s clear and present danger 
test.143 Because of the “bad tendency” of the defendants’ speech, 
the Court upheld the convictions, even though the lower court 
had sentenced the defendants to lengthy prison terms of twenty 
years.144 Under the majority’s use of the bad tendency test, the 
government could prohibit speech if it could tend to bring about 
harmful results.  
Justice Holmes argued that it was ridiculous to assume 
these pamphlets would actually hinder the government’s war 
 
 135 See id. at 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 136 Id. at 623–24.  
 137 Espionage Act of 1970, ch. 30, sec. 3, 40 Stat. 21 (as amended May 16, 1918 at ch. 
75, §3, 40 Stat. 553) (repealed 1948). 
 138 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624–25 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 139 Id. at 624–26 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 140 Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 141 Id. at 622. 
 142 Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 143 See id. at 621 (“Men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the 
effects which their acts were likely to produce.”). The free speech defense was very briefly 
dismissed as “sufficiently discussed and is definitely negatived in Schenck . . .” and other 
cases. Id. at 619. 
 144 Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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efforts in Germany, which is what the statute required.145 He 
then quickly moved beyond the language of the statute to 
consider the constitutional issues. Holmes contended that the 
government could only restrict freedom of expression when there 
was “present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it 
about . . . Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the 
mind of the country.”146  
Laws regulating free speech, Justice Holmes conceded, would 
be an effective way for the government to stifle opposition, but he 
maintained hope that people would realize that: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that 
the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . . That . . . is the theory of our Constitution.147 
Justice Holmes warned against overzealous repression of 
unpopular ideas: 
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression 
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they 
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country.148 
Still, he hardly embraced any robust restriction on government 
power over speech: 
[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by 
an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger 
that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or 
have any appreciable tendency to do so. Publishing those opinions for the 
very purpose of obstructing however, might indicate a greater danger and 
at any rate would have the quality of an attempt. So I assume that the 
second leaflet if published for the purposes alleged in the fourth count 
might be punishable.149 
Under Justice Holmes’s utilitarian theory, we are left to 
wonder why the government must wait until the dangers of the 
plan are immediate. If one can punish such speech if it is successful, 
would it not be better to nip the problem in the bud? Justice Holmes 
himself concedes, “Publishing those opinions for the very purpose of 
obstructing however, might indicate a greater danger and at any 
rate would have the quality of an attempt.”150 
 
 145 Id. at 626–27 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. at 626–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 147 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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If the government can prosecute if the danger becomes greater, 
why wait until it is a greater danger? Justice Holmes’s rationale 
does not explain (to turn to the fire analogy, once again) why the 
firefighters should wait until the little blaze becomes a big fire 
before trying to squelch it. If the danger is very great, such as the 
danger of a forcible overthrow of the government, should we not nip 
it in the bud? Why wait until the revolutionaries have advanced 
from pistols to Howitzers? If a speaker is haranguing a crowd, and 
the crowd seems uninterested, is that not the best time to take 
down the speaker, before the crowd gets bigger and when it is not 
absorbed with radical ideas? 
C. The Gitlow Decision 
Six years after Abrams, the Court continued to use the “bad 
tendency test” to uphold restrictions on free speech. State prosecutors 
convicted defendants in Gitlow v. New York, of violating New York’s 
“criminal anarchy statute.”151 This law prohibited advocating for a 
violent overthrow of the government.152 Defendants had printed and 
circulated a radical manifesto encouraging political strikes.153 There 
was no evidence that the manifesto had any effect on the individuals 
who received copies.154 The manifesto was unpersuasive.155 
The majority of the Gitlow Court once again upheld the 
conviction and the statute, finding the “clear and present danger” 
test inapplicable. The Court reasoned that the clear and present 
danger test applies when a statute prohibiting particular acts 
does not include any restrictions on the use of language.156 Only 
then, the majority argued, should a court use the “clear and 
present danger” test to determine if the particular speech is 
constitutionally protected.157 In such a case, where the statute 
does not ban speech directly, the government must prove the 
defendants’ language brought about the statutorily prohibited 
result.158 However, Gitlow noted that the legislature had already 
determined what utterances would violate the statute.159 The 
government’s decision that certain words are likely to cause the 
substantive evil “is not open for consideration.”160 The government 
must then show only that there is a reasonable basis for the 
 
 151 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1925). 
 152 Id. at 654. 
 153 Id. at 655–56. 
 154 Id. at 656. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 671. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 670–71. 
 159 Id. at 670.  
 160 Id.  
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statute. It is irrelevant that the particular words do or do not 
create a “clear and present danger.”161 
Justice Holmes dissented. He argued that if the “clear and 
present danger” test were properly applied, it would be obvious 
there was no real danger that the defendants’ pamphlets would 
instigate political revolution.162 If the manifesto presented an 
immediate threat to the stability of the government, then there 
would be a need for suppression.163 In the absence of immediate 
danger, Justice Holmes concluded, the defendants were entitled 
to exercise their First Amendment rights. 
Yet, Justice Holmes once again appeared to concede that the 
government could limit speech if the speaker is convincing. He 
would protect the defendants in this case because their “redundant 
discourse . . . had no chance of starting a present conflagration.”164 
The Constitution, it would seem, only protects boring speakers. 
Persuasive speakers are fair game for criminal prosecution under 
Justice Holmes’s rationale. 
If the government may limit speech when it becomes persuasive, 
why wait? The government should be able to stop the problem at its 
source. Justice Holmes’s rationale for the “clear and present danger”  
test suggests that the state can crush dissent when people start to 
believe in it (a “present” danger). If that is true, one might think that 
the state should not have to wait—just like firefighters should not 
wait to act until the brushfire becomes a barnburner.  
D. Whitney, Justice Brandeis, and the Influence of Pericles 
In the Court’s 1927 decision, Whitney v. California,165 the “clear 
and present danger ”  test made its appearance yet again, and this 
time at least it was in a concurrence, rather than a dissent. Still, it 
did not protect the defendant. In fact, when Justice Holmes was on 
the Court, it never used the “clear and present danger” test to  
overturn any conviction. 
The government convicted Ms. Whitney of violating the 
California Criminal Syndicalism Act by assisting in the organization 
of the Communist Labor Party of California.166 The statute defined 
criminal syndicalism as any doctrine “advocating, teaching or aiding 
 
 161 See id. 
 162 Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 163 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 164 Id. (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 165 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 166 Id. at 360–64.  
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and abetting . . . crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of force and 
violence” to effect political or economic change.167 
Ms. Whitney said that she attended the organizing convention 
to advocate for political reform through the democratic process.168 
The majority of the Court, however, disagreed with her and found 
that she supported change through violence and terrorism.169 She 
maintained that she had not assisted the Communist Party with 
knowledge of its illegal purpose. The state based her conviction on 
her mere presence at the convention.170 
The Court held that the jury had resolved adversely to Ms. 
Whitney important factual questions, concluding that (1) she had 
participated at the convention, (2) the united action of the 
Communist Party threatened the welfare of the state, and (3) she 
was a part of that organization.171 That was enough for the 
majority, and they affirmed her conviction.172 
What is significant about Whitney is Justice Brandeis’s 
concurring opinion. Justice Brandeis labeled his opinion 
“concurring,” but it reads like a dissent. His technical reason for 
affirming the conviction (Ms. Whitney did not specifically raise the 
“clear and present danger” test), was probably a ploy or stratagem. 
The Justices can call their opinions whatever they want. He likely 
wanted his opinion to carry more authority for future Justices, and 
an opinion called “concurring” should carry more weight than a 
dissent, which is, by definition, not precedent. Justice Brandeis 
understood that the Supreme Court had not yet used Justice 
Holmes’s clear and present danger test to overturn a free speech 
conviction. If the Court used it at all, it only did so to affirm a 
conviction. (Justice Brandeis did not know it yet, but the Supreme 
Court would never use the clear and present danger test to overturn 
a state or federal conviction based on criminal syndicalism.) 
Justice Brandeis’s opinion, which Justice Holmes joined, 
upheld the conviction only on a narrow procedural ground.173 More 
importantly, he offered a rationale for free speech that was much 
more principled than Justice Holmes’s rationale. It did not adopt 
Justice Holmes’s concession that the government could not ban 
boring speech but could ban persuasive speech. One fatal flaw in 
Justice Holmes’s reasoning is that, by conceding that the 
government can punish persuasive speech, he allowed the 
 
 167 Id. at 359. 
 168 See id. at 367. 
 169 Id. at 367–68.  
 170 Id.  
 171 See id. at 367–72. 
 172 Id. at 372.  
 173 See id. at 372–74 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
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government to respond that it should be able to thwart the problem 
early, by banning the same speech before it becomes persuasive. 
The First Amendment does not protect much if it only protects the 
speaker engaged in a “redundant discourse,” who has “no chance of 
starting a present conflagration.”174 
Justice Brandeis, first, specifically objected to any notion, first 
presented in Gitlow, that the enactment of a statute foreclosed the 
application of the clear and present danger test by the Court.175 
Then he proceeded to justify the right of free speech even for those 
who protest a war or advocate communism or similar doctrines. 
To do that, he adopted the rationale of Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Pericles, and Aeschylus, nearly two and one-half millennia earlier. 
Justice Brandeis focused on “incitement.”176 
Justice Brandeis argued that the state does not ordinarily 
have “the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and 
political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to 
be false and fraught with evil consequence.”177 That is because 
the Framers “valued liberty both as an end and as a means.”178 
Those who drafted the First Amendment “believed liberty to be 
the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.”179 
His words mirrored similar sentiments in the funeral oration of 
Pericles, who said that we should regard “courage to be freedom 
and freedom to be happiness . . . .”180 
Justice Brandeis also argued that free speech does not 
undermine, but rather secures public order: “[R]epression breeds 
hate; . . . hate menaces stable government; . . . the path of safety 
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
proposed remedies . . . . ”181 That argument channeled Pericles 
who said, “The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not 
discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by 
discussion preparatory to action.”182 
 
 174 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 175 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are essential to its  
validity.”); see also SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 161–71 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983). 
 176 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).  
 177 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 178 Id. (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 179 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 180 1 PERICLES, THUCYDIDES 116, 122 (B. Jowett trans., Clarendon Press, 1881). 
 181 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 182 1 PERICLES, supra note 180, at 119 (emphasis added). 
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Justice Brandeis’s concurrence emphasized that the 
government must prove incitement—an unthinking, Pavlovian 
response from the audience: 
[E]ven advocacy of [law] violation, however, reprehensible morally, is 
not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls 
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy 
would be immediately acted on . . . [N]o danger flowing from speech 
can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil 
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion.183 
The government cannot ban speech that “falls short of 
incitement.”184 Only when speech is in a context that it causes 
unthinking, immediate action is the rationale for the protection 
of the First Amendment withdrawn. That is because when the 
speaker incites the crowd—for example, the leader incites a lynch 
mob, or the man knowingly and falsely shouts fire in a crowded 
theater knowing that the crowd will listen to him and believe 
him— there is no opportunity for full discussion. There is no way 
to counter the speech we do not like by presenting more speech. 
Justice Brandeis concluded that in situations where the rights 
of free speech and assembly were infringed, the defendant might 
contest this suppression alleging a violation of free speech. 
Instead, Ms. Whitney had challenged her conviction on the basis of 
a denial of due process; therefore, Justice Brandeis said that he 
was unable to pass on the free speech issue.185 This technicality 
meant that Justice Brandeis was able to call his opinion a 
concurrence, thus lending it more authority for future citations. 
Justice Brandeis’s plea for toleration fell on deaf ears. Recall that 
during the second Red Scare, in the 1950s, the federal government 
once again prosecuted those who advocated anarchy, communism, 
and social unrest.186 Recall also that Justice Frankfurter, concurring 
in Dennis v. United States,187 thought that—unlike in Justice 
Brandeis’s day—there is now “ample justification for a legislative 
judgment that the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat to 
national order and security.”188 
 
 183 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376–77 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 184 Id. (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 185 Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 186 See Landon R. Y. Storrs, McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare, OXFORD RES. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA: AM. HISTORY (2015), http://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/ 
acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-6 [http://perma.cc/XA7A-YLFH]. 
 187 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 188 Id. at 541–42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Justice Frankfurter was not alone. His factual assertions were 
also “obvious” to the Dennis plurality, which upheld the conviction. 
Chief Justice Vinson spoke for the plurality: 
Obviously, the words [clear and present danger] cannot mean that 
before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about 
to be executed . . . . If Government is aware that a group aiming at its 
overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members . . . action by the 
Government is required . . . . Certainly an attempt to overthrow the 
Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of 
inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil 
for Congress to prevent.189 
Chief Justice Vinson said the Court must look at “the gravity 
of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability.”190 The evil in this 
case is the overthrow of the government. That evil is so grave 
that the government may punish speech that is unlikely to be 
persuasive and is far divorced from any action. 
Justice Holmes used his clear and present danger test to uphold 
the conviction of Mr. Schenck and his colleagues for mailing leaflets 
arguing that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment.191 This 
test became an even weaker protection for unpopular speech when 
Chief Justice Vinson turned the test on its head. As the potential evil 
becomes greater, the need for the government to move earlier is 
greater, so the less clear and present the danger may be.  
There was a long and winding road from Justice Brandeis’s 
concurrence in Whitney to the modern free speech doctrine. Rather 
than retrace each step, a journey that one can take elsewhere,192 let 
us move to the modern right to advance unpopular speech, to 
propagate hate, and to advocate (but not engage in) violence and 
other illegal conduct. The modern view rejects “clear and present 
danger” and adopts a stricter test that incorporates and extends 
Justice Brandeis’s rationale. 
VI. THE MODERN TEST  
During the late 1960s, the Court focused on protecting the 
advocacy of unpopular ideas. Thus, this modern test is much more 
protective of the right to dissent. It grew out of four cases decided by 
the Court in the late 1960s: Bond v. Floyd,193 Watts v. United 
 
 189 Id. at 509 (Vinson, C.J., speaking for a plurality). Only Justices Black and Douglas 
dissented. See id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 190 Id. at 510 (Vinson, C.J. speaking for a plurality) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 
183 F.2d 201, 210 (Hand, C.J.)). 
 191 See supra Part V.A. 
 192 See generally 5 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, §§ 20.1–20.17. 
 193 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
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States,194 Brandenburg v. Ohio,195 and Hess v. Indiana.196 The last 
two cases, in particular, create the modern incitement test, which 
requires the government to prove that the speaker both subjectively 
and objectively intended to incite immediate and unthinking 
lawless violence in a situation that makes this purpose likely 
to be successful.197 
A. The Julian Bond Case 
Mr. Julian Bond was a duly elected member of the Georgia 
House of Representative.198 The other Members of the Georgia 
House refused to seat him. The problem was that Mr. Bond had 
publicly expressed his support of a statement issued by the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) criticizing 
the “United States’ involvement in Viet Nam” and the operation 
of the draft laws.199 The Georgia legislature conducted a special 
hearing to determine if Mr. Bond, in good faith, could take the 
mandatory oath to support the Constitution.200 At the legislative 
hearing, Mr. Bond said that he was willing and able to take his 
oath of office.201 He testified that he supported individuals who 
burned their draft cards but, he added, he did not burn his own 
nor had he counseled anyone to burn their card.202 Nonetheless, 
the Georgia House voted not to administer the oath or seat Mr. 
Bond. He sued and that led to Bond v. Floyd.203 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Georgia House violated 
Mr. Bond’s right of free expression.204 Although the oath of office was 
constitutionally valid, Chief Justice Warren wrote, this requirement 
did not empower the state representatives to challenge a duly elected 
legislator’s sincerity in swearing allegiance to the Constitution.205 
Such authority could be used to stifle dissents of legislators who 
disagreed with majority views.206  
The Court also ruled that it would be unconstitutional for 
the federal government to convict Mr. Bond under the Selective 
Service Act for counseling or aiding persons to evade or refuse 
 
 194 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
 195 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 196 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). 
 197 See 5 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, § 20.15(d). 
 198 See Bond, 385 U.S. at 118. 
 199 Id. at 118–21. 
 200 Id. at 123.  
 201 Id. at 125.  
 202 Id. at 123–24. The Supreme Court later upheld the constitutionality of federal laws 
punishing draft card burning in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968). 
 203 Bond, 385 U.S. at 123, 125–26. 
 204 Id. at 137. 
 205 Id. at 132. 
 206 See id. 
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registration.207 The Court said that one could not reasonably 
interpret Mr. Bond’s statements “as a call to unlawful refusal to 
be drafted.”208 Mr. Bond actually appeared to be advocating legal 
alternatives to the draft, not inciting people to violate the law. 
The Court concluded that Mr. Bond’s punishment for these 
statements violated the First Amendment.209 
B. The Watts Decision 
A harbinger of the later cases is Watts v. United States.210 In 
a brief, per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Mr. 
Watts’s conviction for violating a statute prohibiting persons from 
“knowingly and willfully . . . threat[ening] to take the life of or to 
inflict bodily harm upon the President . . . .”211 Mr. Watts, during a 
public rally in Washington, D.C., stated he would not report for his 
scheduled draft physical. Then, he referred to President Johnson 
(L.B.J.) and added: 
If they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights 
is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.212 
The Court said that the statute was “constitutional on its 
face,” because the nation certainly has a valid interest in 
protecting the President.213 However, the Court must interpret 
this statute narrowly, so that it does not criminalize pure 
speech, protected by the First Amendment.214 “What is a threat 
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected 
speech.”215 Mr. Watts’s statement was only “political 
hyperbole” and not a “true threat.”216 
 
 207 Id. at 132–33.  
 208 Id. at 133. 
 209 Id. at 134 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Yates v. United States, 
354 U.S. 298 (1957); and Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 U.S. 1 (1949)). 
 210 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 211 Id. at 705.  
 212 Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213 Id. at 707. 
 214 Id.  
 215 Id.  
 216 Id. at 708 (concluding that the government must “prove a true ‘threat’”); see also 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“‘True threats’ encompass 
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”). The plurality ruled that a provision of the Virginia cross burning statute, 
which stated that burning a cross in public view “shall be prima facie evidence of an 
intent to intimidate,” was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it 
was not limited to “true threats.” Id. at 347–48. It is a “true threat” if “a speaker directs a 
threat to a person . . . with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death.” Id. at 359–60. A “true threat” is one “where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.” Id. at 359 (emphasis added). “[S]ome cross burnings fit 
within this meaning of intimidating speech and rightly so.” Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
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The language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and 
inexact. [The defendant’s] only offense here was “a kind of very crude 
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.”217 
One must consider Mr. Watts’s statement in context: His 
“threat” was conditional, and his listeners responded by laughing. 
His words should only be interpreted as an expression of political 
belief. Moreover, the circumstances of Mr. Watts’s speech did not 
amount to a literal incitement of violence. If it had, the Court’s 
reasoning and analysis would have been different. 
The influence of the “incitement” prong of Justice Brandeis’s 
concurrence in Whitney218 is evident in both Bond and Watts. The 
pivotal determination in Bond was the fact that the defendant was 
merely expressing his grievances with the government, not 
inciting a lynch mob to unlawful action. Furthermore, the Court 
reversed the defendant’s conviction in Watts because his statement 
did not clearly present any imminent threat to the President. 
Later, the Court clarified that a “true threat” requires not only 
that the recipient of the threat believe it to be a real and serious 
threat, but also that the defendant intended to issue a true threat, 
had scienter, and specifically knew that the communications would be 
viewed as threats.219  
This leads to the two decisions that incorporate the learning 
and mistakes of the past to give us the modern test—Brandenburg 
v. Ohio,220 and Hess v. Indiana.221 The origins of this modern test lie 
2500 years ago. 
C. The Brandenburg Test 
The culmination of the modern test is found in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio.222 It signaled a major shift in the Court. Many 
commentators at the time did not appreciate its significance 
because the Court issued its ruling in a brief per curiam opinion,223 
a designation often given to less significance opinions. The Warren 
Court rejected the limited protection of the “clear and present 
danger” test as Justice Holmes had advanced it, and instead 
 
 217 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 218 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 219 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011–12 (2015) (holding that, in 
order for the government to convict the defendant of issuing threats on Facebook, it must 
prove that the defendant, with scienter, intended to issue and true threat or knew that 
communications would be viewed as threats). Defendant said such things as, “if worse 
comes to worse I’ve got enough explosives,” and, “hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 
Kindergarten class.” Id. at 2006. 
 220 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 221 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). 
 222 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 223 Id. at 444.  
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adopted crucial differences in phrasing and emphasis to assure that 
its free speech protections would not be diluted.224 
Instead, Brandenburg created a new test. First, it explicitly 
overruled the Whitney decision.225 It did not adopt the clear and 
present danger test, and never explicitly referred to it. However, 
Justices Black and Douglas did: In their separate concurrences they 
made clear that, “the ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine should 
have no place in the interpretation of the First Amendment.”226 
Brandenburg also added new vigor to the reasoning of Justice 
Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney, and eliminated the open-ended 
use of the test that had prevailed in the “bad tendency” and 
“balancing” years. 
The Brandenburg Court’s per curiam opinion reversed the 
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for violating Ohio’s criminal 
syndicalism statute.227 Ohio charged Brandenburg with advocating 
political reform through violence and assembling with a group 
formed to teach criminal syndicalism.228 The facts showed that a 
man identified as Brandenburg arranged for a television news crew 
to attend a Ku Klux Klan rally.229 During the news film made at the 
rally, Klan members, including Brandenburg, discussed the group’s 
plan to march on Congress.230 
The Court acknowledged that it had upheld a similar criminal 
syndicalism statute in Whitney, but the Court said, later decisions 
discredited Whitney.231 The Court then held that the right of free 
speech protects advocacy of violence as long as the advocacy did 
not incite people to imminent action.232 The key is “incitement.” 
When a speaker uses speech to cause unthinking, immediate 
lawless action, one cannot rely on more speech in the market place 
of ideas to correct the errors of the original speech; there simply is 
not enough time, because there is an incitement. In these rare 
cases, the state has a significant interest in, and no other means of 
preventing, the resulting lawless conduct. The situation is 
comparable to someone urging the lynch mob to string up the 
prisoner. Or, to apply this test to Justice Holmes’s analogy, it is akin 
 
 224 Id. at 450. 
 225 See id. at 449 (overturning Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)). 
 226 Id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring); see also id. at 454 (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(“I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any ‘clear and present danger’ 
test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling as the Court in 
Dennis rephrased it.”). 
 227 Id. at 444–45.  
 228 See id. at 445. 
 229 Id.  
 230 See id. at 446.  
 231 Id. at 447. 
 232 Id.  
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to someone (a) knowingly and falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded 
theater (b) with the intent to cause a riot, in such circumstances, 
(c) where there is no time for reasoned debate, because both the 
intent of the speaker, his objective words, his scienter (he is 
knowingly and falsely shouting), and the circumstances in which he 
harangues the crowd amount to incitement. 
Thus, Brandenburg developed a new, four-part test that 
emphasizes the need for the state to prove incitement. For the 
state conviction to be valid, the state must prove: (1) the speaker 
subjectively intended incitement; (2) in context, the words used are 
“likely to incite or produce” “imminent, lawless action;”233 and 
(3) the words used by the speaker objectively encouraged, urged, 
and (4) provoked imminent action. The Court made clear this third 
part of the test, with its focus on the objective words used by the 
speaker, in a later decision, Hess v. Indiana,234 discussed below. 
The Brandenburg Court then summarized the new test for 
speech that advocates unlawful conduct: The state may not 
“forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”235 Merely teaching abstract doctrines, the Court noted, 
was not like leading a group in a violent action. Moreover, the 
statute must be narrowly drawn to reflect these limitations. 
If the statute failed to distinguish between advocacy of a theory 
and advocacy of action, it abridges First Amendment freedoms. 
Criminal syndicalism, as defined in the Ohio statute, did not 
pass the Brandenburg test.236 The statute forbade teaching of violent 
political revolution with the intent of spreading such doctrine or 
assembling with a group advocating this doctrine.237 At the 
defendant’s trial, the prosecution made no attempt to distinguish 
between incitement and advocacy. Thus, the Ohio statute abridged 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.238 Any law punishing mere 
 
 233 Id. at 447 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (“[A]dvocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”  
(emphasis added)). 
 234 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam); see also Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating 
Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1179, 1193–94 (2005).  
 235 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas concurred separately 
entering the caveat that there was no place for the clear and present danger test in any cases 
involving First Amendment rights. Id. at 452 (Douglas, J., concurring). He was distrustful of 
the test, which he believed could be easily manipulated to deny constitutional protection to any 
speech critical of existing government. Id. at 451–52 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black 
also concurred separately, and similarly objected to the clear and present danger test as 
insufficiently protective of free speech. Id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring). 
 236 Id. at 449.  
 237 See id.  
 238 Id. at 448–49. 
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advocacy of Ku Klux Klan doctrine and the assembling of Klan 
members to advocate their beliefs was unconstitutional. 
Brandenburg’s new formulation offers broad, new protection for 
strong advocacy. Its major focus is on the inciting language of the 
speaker—that is, on the objective words. In addition, it stresses the 
need to show that the speech is directed to produce immediate, 
unthinking lawless action and that, in fact, the situation makes this 
purpose likely to be successful. 
D. Hess v. Indiana and its Vindication of Brandenburg 
A post-Warren Court decision, Hess v. Indiana,239 is 
significant because it demonstrates that the Court is serious and 
literal in its application of the test proposed in Brandenburg. 
The police arrested Mr. Hess (who was subsequently convicted) for 
disorderly conduct when he shouted “we’ll take the fucking street 
later (or again)” during an antiwar demonstration.240 Two 
witnesses testified Mr. Hess did not appear to exhort 
demonstrators to go into the street that the police had just cleared, 
that he was facing the crowd, and that his tone of voice (although 
loud) was no louder than any of the other demonstrators.241 The 
Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that Mr. 
Hess intended his remarks to incite further riotous behavior and 
were likely to produce such a result.242 
However, the Supreme Court reversed, and in its brief per 
curiam opinion the Court stated: 
At best, . . . the statement could be taken as counsel for present 
moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of 
illegal action at some indefinite future time. This is not sufficient to 
permit the State to punish Hess’[s] speech. Under our decisions, “the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a 
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”243 
Because Mr. Hess’s speech was “not directed to any person or 
group of persons,” he had not advocated action that would 
produce imminent disorder.244 Mr. Hess’s statements, therefore, 
did not violate the disorderly conduct statutes.245 
 
 239 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973) (per curiam). 
 240 Id. at 106–07. 
 241 Id. at 107. 
 242 Id.  
 243 Id. at 108 (emphasis in original) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). 
 244 Id. at 108–09.  
 245 Id.  
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Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Blackmun, strongly dissented to the per curiam opinion’s 
“somewhat antiseptic description of this massing” of people and 
preferred to rely on the decision of the trial court, which was free 
to reject some testimony and accept other testimony.246 The 
majority, Justice Rehnquist claimed, was merely interpreting the 
evidence differently, and thus exceeding the proper scope of 
review.247 The majority was unmoved. There was some evidence 
that Mr. Hess’s “statement could be taken as counsel for present 
moderation” and hence his “objective words” did not meet the 
requirements of Brandenburg.248 
The new Brandenburg test—a test more vigorously phrased and 
strictly applied than the older clear and present danger test—now is 
the proper formula for determining when speech that advocates 
criminal conduct may constitutionally be punished. With its 
emphasis on incitement, imminent lawless action, and the objective 
words of the speaker, the Brandenburg test should provide a strong 
measure of First Amendment protection.  
When a speaker advocates violence using speech that does 
not literally incite,249 the Court should protect the speaker. The 
government might urge the Court to look for proximity to 
violence rather than to the literal words of incitement. However, 
Brandenburg rejects that theory.250 
 
 246 See id. at 110–11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 247 Id. at 109, 111–12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 248 See id. at 108.  
 249 Consider the application of this principle to those who sue the media because of 
what they broadcast. A woman sued a television network and publisher for injuries 
inflicted by persons whom, she alleged, were stimulated by watching a scene of brutality 
broadcast in a television drama. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Niemi, 434 U.S. 1354 (1978), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978), appeal after remand 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981). The 
petitioners sought a stay of the state court order remanding for a trial. Id. Circuit Justice 
Rehnquist denied the stay for procedural reasons, and he noted that the trial judge 
rendered judgment for petitioners because he found that the film “did not advocate or 
encourage violent and depraved acts and thus did not constitute an incitement.” Id. at 
1356. The Brandenburg test should be applicable to determine the free speech defense to 
plaintiff ’s tort claim. 
See also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988), which overturned a jury verdict against Hustler Magazine 
arising out of the death of an adolescent who attempted sexual practice described in a 
magazine article. Id. “[W]e hold that liability cannot be imposed on Hustler on the basis 
that the article was an incitement to attempt a potentially fatal act without  
impermissibly infringing upon freedom of speech.” Id. 
 250 See, for example, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982), 
which declared:  
The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers’[s] speeches did not 
transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg. The 
lengthy addresses generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to 
unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and 
economic power available to them. In the course of those pleas, strong language 
Do Not Delete 5/29/2019 2:36 PM 
356 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
E. Brandenburg, Marc Antony, and Shouting Fire 
Brandenburg’s new formulation offers broad, new protection 
for strong advocacy. Its major focus is on the inciting language of 
the speaker, that is, on the objective words, in addition to the 
need to show that the speaker subjectively intends the speech to 
produce immediate, unthinking lawless action in a situation that 
makes this purpose likely to be successful. 
Let us apply this test to another funeral oration, not the oration 
of Pericles, but Marc Antony’s funeral oration in Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar. Here are a few of Antony’s words: 
I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.  
The evil that men do lives after them, 
The good is oft interrèd with their bones;  
So let it be with Caesar. The noble Brutus  
Hath told you Caesar was ambitious;  
If it were so, it was a grievous fault, . . .  
[Caesar] was my friend, faithful and just to me,  
But Brutus says he was ambitious,  
And Brutus is an honourable man. . .  
I thrice presented him a kingly crown,  
Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition?  
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious, 
And sure he is an honourable man.  
I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke, . . . 
My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar,  
And I must pause till it come back to me.251 
First, we can safely assume that Antony subjectively 
intended incitement. Second, in context, the words used were 
likely to produce imminent, lawless action. We all know what 
 
was used. If that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial 
question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the 
consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this case, however--with the possible 
exception of the Cox incident--the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred 
weeks or months after the April 1, 1966 speech; the chancellor made no finding 
of any violence after the challenged 1969 speech. Strong and effective 
extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. 
An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and 
emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals 
do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 251 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2, at 66–71, 77–79, 88–92, 98–99 
(Marvin Spevack ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (1599).  
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happened next: Civil War. Antony’s side won, although it was a 
short-lived victory for Antony. His ally, Octavius Caesar, soon 
turned against him and forced him to commit suicide.252  
Still, Antony’s speech does not meet the third part of the 
test—the words used by the speaker must objectively encourage, 
urge, and provoke imminent action. This third part of the test, 
with its focus on the speaker’s objective words, protects Antony. 
He did not literally advocate violence. Indeed, he said his 
opponents were “honourable” men. He did not advocate war: He 
said he only spoke to bury Caesar. Thus, the ruling in 
Brandenburg would protect him. And in so doing the First 
Amendment protects all of us. 
VII. APPLYING THE MODERN TEST TO UNDERSTAND THE 
MODERN LAW 
A. Fighting Words 
In the era before Brandenburg, the Court created a category 
of unpopular speech that the First Amendment did not protect, 
so-called “fighting words.” The first case was Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, decided in 1942, during World War II.253 The 
defendant, Walter Chaplinsky, encountered the city fire marshal, 
addressed him as a “God damned racketeer and a damned 
fascist.”254 The Court upheld his conviction under a state statute 
banning face-to-face words having “a direct tendency to cause 
acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark 
is addressed.”255 “The test,” said the Court, “is what men of 
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to 
cause an average addressee to fight.”256 
We can think of the speech in Brandenburg or in Hess, as a call 
for mayhem on a wholesale level. Recall that neither speech in 
those cases met the strict three-part requirements of incitement 
that would allow the government to intervene. The call to fight in 
Chaplinsky we might compare to a call for mayhem on a retail level, 
face-to-face. However, that speech hardly met the test laid out in 
Brandenburg and Hess, yet the Court affirmed the conviction. 
The Court indicated some discomfort with the Chaplinsky 
“fighting words” test in Terminiello v. Chicago.257 In Terminiello, 
the Court invalidated the defendant’s breach of the peace 
 
 252 See generally id. 
 253 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 254 Id. at 569. 
 255 Id. at 573.  
 256 Id. 
 257 337 U.S. 1, 26 (1949). 
Do Not Delete 5/29/2019 2:36 PM 
358 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
conviction for denouncing Jews and others.258 However, the Court 
reversed the conviction without reaching the question of whether 
the speech constituted “fighting words.” Instead, the Court found 
the jury instruction was in error.259 The trial judge had 
instructed the jury to convict if the speech “stirs the public to 
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or 
creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the 
enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.”260 Denouncing 
the instruction, the Court stated that “a function of free speech 
under our system of government is to invite dispute,” and do the 
other things explicitly forbidden by the jury instruction.261 A 
conviction “resting on any of those grounds [relied on in the jury 
instruction] may not stand.”262 
The last Supreme Court decision that embraced the “fighting 
words” doctrine is now two-thirds of a century old, Feiner v. New 
York.263 It spoke of a possible “fighting words” exception to free 
speech—that case no longer lives with any vigor. 
Feiner upheld the disorderly conduct misdemeanor conviction 
of Irving Feiner, who was speaking on a street corner, calling 
President Truman a “bum,” and the American Legion the “Nazi 
Gestapo.”264 Some in the crowd were hostile and others favored Mr. 
Feiner. After he had spoken for about a half hour urging blacks to 
“rise up in arms,” the police arrested him and led him away in an 
effort to prevent violent reaction.265 The Court reasoned,  
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the 
suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the 
speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes 
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace. 266  
Notice that the Court did say, as a factual matter, that Mr. 
Feiner was inciting the crowd and upheld the conviction. Justices 
Black, Douglas, and Minton dissented.267 
Feiner was the high-water mark for the “fighting words” 
doctrine. Subsequent Supreme Court cases chipped away at it 
over the years.268 For example, in Gooding v. Wilson, Mr. Johnny 
C. Wilson said to police officers who were attempting to restore 
 
 258 Id. at 3, 5–6.  
 259 Id. 
 260 Id.  
 261 Id. at 4.  
 262 Id. at 5. 
 263 340 U.S. 315, 331–32 (1951).  
 264 Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 265 See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 266 Id. at 321. 
 267 Id. (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 329 (Douglas, J., joined by Minton, J., dissenting). 
 268 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
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order to a public building: “White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you,” and 
to another: “You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me 
again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.”269 The Georgia statute prohibited 
“opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a 
breach of the peace . . . .”270 The state standard allowed juries to 
determine guilt as “measured by common understanding and 
practice”271—a phrase too broad and not necessarily limited to 
incitement. What the defendant said would not “tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace”272 and the Court overturned 
Wilson’s conviction.273 
After Brandenburg and Hess, the Court held that the state 
could not allow a tort for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress because a congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church 
picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God 
hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, 
particularly in America’s military.274 The offensive picketers 
peacefully displayed their signs stating, for example, “Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers.”275 The Court explained, “[i]f there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”276 
One case in the Sixth Circuit illustrates the reluctance of 
some judges to recognize the modern full-bodied protection of free 
speech.277 The first opinion in that case ignored the lessons of 
Brandenburg and Hess and applied the “fighting words” test to 
restrict free speech.278 In the second opinion, the en banc Sixth 
Circuit overturned the panel and embraced Brandenburg and Hess. 
The case arose because a Christian evangelical group was 
“preaching hate and denigration to a crowd of Muslims, some of 
whom responded with threats of violence” during a city festival 
celebrating Arab culture.279 The police responded by removing 
the evangelicals, who then filed a civil rights claim under 42 
U.S.C. 1983 against the sheriff and deputies, alleging that they 
 
 269 Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 270 Id. at 519.  
 271 Id. at 528. 
 272 Id. at 522 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) 
(emphasis added)). 
 273 See id. at 520.  
 274 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011). 
 275 Id. at 448.  
 276 Id. at 458 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 277 See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 2013 (2016). 
 278 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 765 F.3d 578, 597 (6th Cir. 2014) rev’d, 805 F.3d 
228 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 279 Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 234. 
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violated the evangelicals’ rights to freedom of speech, free 
exercise of religion, and equal protection by cutting off their 
protests.280 The trial court entered summary judgment for the 
defendants, and the Sixth Circuit panel affirmed.281 But the en 
banc Sixth Circuit reversed and protected the hate speech.282 
The state may not silence the speaker as expedient or efficient 
alternative to containing rioting individuals’ lawless behavior  
because there is no right to a heckler’s veto.283 The en banc court 
recognized that Feiner and “fighting words” only exist when the 
speaker is engaged in incitement within the meaning of Brandenburg 
and Hess.284 As the en banc Sixth Circuit makes clear: 
Maintenance of the peace should not be achieved at the expense of the 
free speech. The freedom to espouse sincerely held religious, political, 
or philosophical beliefs, especially in the face of hostile opposition, is 
too important to our democratic institution for it to be abridged simply 
due to the hostility of reactionary listeners who may be offended by a 
speaker’s message.285 
The incantation of “fighting words” no longer offers a 
justification to restrict speech. It is one thing if a speaker incites 
a lynch mob—that meets the Brandenburg and Hess test—but 
quite another if the speaker promotes hate speech or advocates 
positions that upset the crowd, even if the crowd responds with 
mayhem.286 As Bible Believers explained, in light of the present 
case law, “[t]he better view of Feiner is summed up, simply, by 
the following truism: when a speaker incites a crowd to violence, 
his incitement does not receive constitutional protection.”287 
“Incitement” is a term of art that requires speech, plus something 
else, such as inciting a lynch mob to lynch in a narrow factual 
context.288 That restriction is a bequest from the ancient Greeks. 
B. Provocative Speech in Schools 
Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District is a 
peculiar case, because it endorses a heckler’s veto.289 This case 
held that a public school could prohibit students from wearing 
 
 280 Id. at 241–42.  
 281 Id. at 242. 
 282 Id. at 233, 242. 
 283 Id. at 252, 265 (overruling Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 
1975) because there is no right to a heckler’s veto). 
 284 Id. at 248. 
 285 Id. at 252. 
 286 Id. at 245 (quoting 5 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, § 20.39(a)) (noting that “[t]he 
authority of Feiner has been undercut significantly in subsequent [Supreme Court] cases”). 
 287 Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 245. 
 288 See supra Part VI.E. (discussing Marc Antony’s funeral oration as an example of a 
speech that does not meet the strict Brandenburg and Hess test). 
 289 767 F.3d 764, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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a symbol of the American Flag on their clothing because doing 
so might upset some Mexican American students.290 Yes, we 
live in world where a public school can ban the American Flag 
because it is hate speech, but the government cannot ban 
burning the American Flag.291 Those who support the decision 
in Dariano explain that it was correct for the court to 
“balance” the interests involved; that is only what the First 
Amendment requires, we are told.292 
However, that is not what the Supreme Court ruled when it 
decided a very similar issue in 1969.293 We were in the middle of the 
Vietnam War, and the disputes between the hawks and doves did 
not end with debates in Congress and protests in the streets. They 
continued in our public high schools. The Supreme Court decision 
on this issue was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District.294 Some high school students—the doves—claimed a 
constitutional right to wear black armbands as a symbol to protest 
the Vietnam War.295 The Court has long held that the First 
Amendment protects not only words but also symbols, such as flags, 
banners, pictures of donkeys and elephants.296 
The principals of all of the Des Moines schools sided with the 
hawks. They adopted a policy, first, to ask any student to remove 
the armband protesting the war.297 If the student objected, the 
school would suspend her until she returned without the 
armband.298 Oddly enough, the principals imposed no ban on 
students wearing national political campaigns buttons; some 
students even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of 
Nazism.299 However, a symbol of peace was just too much for the 
schools. They had to draw the line. 
The Court decided against the school district.300 The Court 
acknowledged that the nature of the students’ rights is 
different because a school is not a public forum in the sense 
that a public street is, however, neither students nor teachers 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
 
 290 Id. at 777.  
 291 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 
U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990). 
 292 See, e.g., Julie Hilden, A Ninth Circuit Panel Balances First Amendment Rights 
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 293 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 294 Id.  
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expression at the schoolhouse gate.”301 For example, during a 
history class about the Civil War, no student would have a 
right to disrupt the lesson by asserting a right to talk about 
the Vietnam War. Similarly, the geography teacher can limit 
discussion to issues of geography that relate to that day’s 
lesson. However, wearing black armbands (like wearing 
pierced earrings) does not disrupt the education of the school. 
The Tinker Court understood this distinction: 
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a 
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder 
or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence 
whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the 
schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to be 
secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern 
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the 
rights of other students.302  
Tinkers made clear that the students wearing armbands 
protesting—the doves—were not interfering with anything. Some of 
the students opposed to the doves—the hawks—were upset. A “few 
students [the hawks] made hostile remarks to the children wearing 
armbands,”303 but if schools were going to punish anyone, they 
should punish the hawks. Tinker did not approve of any “heckler’s 
veto.” If the hawks decided to beat up the doves, that would not 
authorize the school to restrict the free speech of the doves. 
Tinker acknowledged that any “word spoken, in class, in the 
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of 
another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.”304 
Nonetheless, the “Constitution says we must take this risk,” and 
our openness is “the basis of our national strength” and part of the 
warp and woof of our “often disputatious” society. If the heckler is 
disturbing the speaker, the law interferes to protect the speaker, 
not the heckler.305 
There have been a few cases since Tinker where the Supreme 
Court has clarified (but not undercut) its holding. For example, a 
school assembly is also not a public forum. If the school provides 
for an assembly for all the students (including some as young as 
fourteen years of age), where students could speak on behalf of 
candidates for student government, then the school could require 
the students not to engage in lewd speech. 306 
 
 301 Id. at 506.  
 302 Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 508–09. 
 306 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
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If the high school students in a journalism class, under the 
supervision of a teacher, publish a school newspaper, the high 
school educators could exercise editorial control over the 
newspaper.307 The high school student newspaper is not a public 
forum; instead, it is part of a course for credit, under the 
teacher’s supervision. More recently, the Court held that the 
school could confiscate a student’s banner advocating illegal drug 
use and ban “student speech at a school event” from promoting 
illegal drug use, in violation of school policy.308 All of these cases 
cited and reaffirmed Tinker. 
The response of the Ninth Circuit in Dariano was to reject 
Tinker and uphold the heckler’s veto.309 Dariano upheld the 
power of the Morgan Hill Unified School District to order 
students to cover up the U.S. flag shirts or go home, because, the 
District claimed, if some students wore those colors on Cinco de 
Mayo, the fifth of May, celebrating Mexican heritage and pride, 
other students might turn to violence.310 The school ban on the 
students wearing American flag colors, as the district court 
explained, was “in order to protect their own safety.”311 
However, these same school administrators did not ask any 
students to refrain from wearing the colors of the Mexican flag 
because, they said, students wearing American flags “were 
threatened with violence,” but students with Mexican flag colors 
were not.312 One might say that the Anglo students were 
threatened, but the “Mexican students” (the term the court 
repeatedly used) were not. Hence, “all students whose safety was 
in jeopardy were treated equally.”313 
The court invented a most unusual rule: If hecklers threaten 
students who do nothing but wear colors that reflect the 
American flag, the school authorities should restrict the peaceful 
students, not the rowdy hecklers. If that is the law, what the 
lawyers for the principals in Tinker should have advised them 
was that they could punish the doves if only the hawks had 
physically threatened and hit the doves. Surely, that cannot be 
what the Tinker Court intended. 
Recall, Tinker found it telling that the school principals did 
not ban all symbols; they allowed students to wear Democratic 
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 308 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007). 
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campaign buttons even if that upset Republicans.314 The 
principals allowed students to wear a symbol of the Nazis, the 
Iron Cross.315 The fact that principals distinguished among the 
types of buttons that were verboten was evidence that the school 
principals were banning symbols because of their content, their 
message. This was not a case where the school principals said, for 
example, that no students could wear armbands or any other 
symbols on their school band uniforms because the whole point of 
uniforms is to be, well, uniform. 
Yet, in California, the rule is different. Mexican students can 
wear Mexican flag colors, but others cannot wear American flag 
colors. Why? The trial court claimed that the Mexican students 
were threatening the other students, but the trial court found no 
evidence that anyone was threatening the Mexican students, so 
the school only protected the hecklers.316  
Let us apply the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning to other 
situations. Assume that some students wear the Star of David 
and other students object and threaten them. These other 
students wear the Iron Cross. The Star of David students 
(perhaps grandchildren of those who barely survived the 
Holocaust) do not threaten violence. The Ninth Circuit rule 
would allow the Iron Cross—but not the Star of David—because 
only the Iron Cross students threatened violence. As the trial 
court said in Dariano, to support its restriction of free speech, a 
male student “shoved a Mexican flag at [a student with an 
American flag symbol] and said something in Spanish expressing 
anger at Plaintiffs’ clothing.”317 The remedy that the Dariano 
court chose was not to punish the student who “shoved a Mexican 
flag” at the other student, but to take away the free speech rights 
of that other student. 
That is not what our high schools should be teaching students. 
We live in a diverse society and, in the words of Tinker, 
“apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to 
freedom of expression.”318 Instead, the Ninth Circuit and the Morgan 
Hill Unified School District prefer to teach schoolchildren that, if you 
want to shut up other fellow students, just rely on the heckler’s veto. 
This school district is not very good at teaching tolerance: Earlier, gay 
students sued this same school district for failing to take action to 
protect them from harassment from their fellow students.319 It would 
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be much better if the school followed Rodney King’s plea that we all 
should learn to “get along.” 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
A newspaper exchange occurred several years ago in a 
prominent legal newspaper on the pros and cons of government 
restrictions on the press corps covering the first Persian Gulf 
War.320 It illustrated a peculiar American tradition. While we 
cling to our First Amendment rights to engage in robust debate 
about national affairs and, ultimately, to dissent from the 
policies of our government, we also indulge a penchant for 
robustly debating the conditions under which we should carry out 
our robust debates about national affairs. You might call this the 
First Amendment squared. 
If there is any disadvantage to this preoccupation, it is that 
outsiders—for example, dictators like Kim Jong-un of North 
Korea—may interpret failure of the United States Government 
to stifle debate and dissent as a sign of weakness and 
divisiveness, perhaps not understanding that dissent in 
America is par for the course. 
None of this gives cause to limit or even question our traditional 
freedoms. But it’s worth a moment of appreciation for what we enjoy 
and a warning about the importance of preserving our expressive 
freedoms even—especially—when they become most inconvenient.  
The lesson that strength lies in free speech goes back at least 
as far as ancient Athens. Strength does not lie in enforced 
silence, but rather in robust dissent. The lessons of history should 
teach us that any efforts by war supporters to attack dissent 
would be adopting the rules of dictators as our own. Our way is to 
slug it out domestically. There is no point at which debate is 
closed. There is no point at which the only acceptable course of 
action is to rally ‘round. Those who will argue—as some always 
do—that our soldiers will be demoralized by domestic dissent sell 
them short and do not understand the premium our Constitution 
places on free speech, or the power that freedom yields. 
The free speech that we now protect in times of war is 
handmaiden to the free speech we must protect in times of peace. 
Hateful speech is, well, hateful, but the remedy, history teaches 
us, is more speech, not less. We protect the rights of Nazis to 
 
 320 See Press Limits: Censorship or Prudence?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at 19. 
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march in Skokie, Illinois, so civil rights protestors can march in 
Selma, Alabama.321 
If we gathered members of the early Congress (which 
enacted the Alien and Sedition Laws) and members of the 
Supreme Court (during the time it adopted the “bad tendency 
test” in the beginning of the twentieth century), they would 
advise us that a country could not conduct a war successfully if 
the government allows those opposed to it to speak out against it 
openly. They would advise us that allowing people to spew 
hurtful speech, could cause unrest and dissension. Throughout 
most of our history, any such gathering would produce the same 
answer. Yet Herodotu, Pericles, Aeschylus, and their fellow 
Athenians knew better. 
There are those who say it is more difficult for a democracy 
to go to war because it cannot conduct the war successfully if the 
people oppose it. That is a good thing, not a bad thing. In modern 
times, no democracy has warred against another. As Pericles 
reminds us, “The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, 
not discussion, but the want of knowledge that is gained by 
discussion preparatory to action.”322 
When the world is full of democracies and the despots and 
terrorists whom they harbor are no more, then we will have 
lasting peace. On the home front, there will always be those 
who preach hate, but we will learn to turn away and ignore 
their message or undercut the speech we do not like with more 
speech, rather than enforced silence. American’s experience 
with free speech tells us something else. The United States has 
not only survived but it has thrived, when it allows dissent, 
even in times of war. And when it punished dissent, our 
history teaches us that the people who enforce the censorship 
are not wise Platonic guardians. 
Under modern free speech doctrine, the government may 
not prohibit or punish hateful, provocative, or offensive speech 
unless it proves incitement, a term of art that requires the 
government to prove that the speaker both subjectively and 
objectively intended to incite immediate, unthinking lawless 
violence before a volatile crowd in a situation that makes this 
intention likely to be successful. The government, under this 
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test, could prohibit haranguing a lynch mob but could not 
punish hate speech. 
As Senator John F. Kennedy said, while running for 
President, “We must know all the facts, and hear all the  
alternatives, and listen to all the criticisms. Let us welcome 
controversial books and controversial authors. For the Bill of 
Rights is the guardian of our security as well as our liberty.”323 
When he said that, he echoed the ancient Greeks. There is little 
new under the sun. 
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